Electronic+voting


 * What is E-Voting?**

The different types of e-voting include: punch cards and marksense or optical scan ballots, and specialized voting kiosks (including self-contained Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems). It can also involve transmission of ballots and votes via telephones, private computer networks, or the Internet.
 * [|Electronic voting]** (also known as **e-voting**) is a term encompassing several different types of voting, embracing both electronic means of casting a vote and electronic means of counting votes.


 * Countries which have used E-voting****: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Estonia, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Switzerland.

__E-Voting in India__**

Electronic Voting Machines which are used in Indian General and State Elections and they were designed by Election Commission of India in collaboration with two Public Sector undertakings viz., Bharat Electronics Limited, Bangalore and Electronic Corporation of India Ltd., Hyderabad. The EVMs are now manufactured by the above two undertakings.



[|Indian voting machines] use a two-piece system with a balloting unit presenting the voter with a button (momentary switch) for each choice connected by a cable to an electronic ballot box. An EVM consists of two units: The two units are joined by a five-meter cable. The Control Unit is with the Presiding Officer or a Polling Officer and the Balloting Unit is placed inside the voting compartment. Instead of issuing a ballot paper, the Polling Officer in-charge of the Control Unit will press the Ballot Button. This will enable the voter to cast his vote by pressing the blue button on the Balloting Unit against the candidate and symbol of his choice. The microchip used in EVMs is manufactured in Japan and it is sealed at the time of import. It cannot be opened and any attempt to rewrite the program cannot be done without damaging the chip.
 * Control Unit
 * Balloting Unit


 * __Limitations of E-Voting in India__**

A candidate can know people from which polling station voted for him and people from which did not. This problem was well-evident in Indian general elections, 2004; the day after the election results were declared, The Times of India, Mumbai carried statistics about which areas in Mumbai voted for which candidate.The Election Commission of India argues that the mixing system of counting can avoid this. The result from each EVM can be fed into a Master Counting Machine and only the total result of an Assembly Constituency will be known and not the result in each individual polling station.


 * E-Voting in Belgium**



In 1994 the electronic voting experiment was extended to around 22% of the Belgian population. Every kind of voting area was tested: big cities, small villages, French speaking, Dutch speaking or legally speaking both languages. In 1999 the system was extended to 44% of the population. However, due to lobbying from groups like PourEva[1] and increasing doubt about the system, new tests were done and more controls were added. The most important test is the introduction of optical reading of paper ballots in two areas. This test was scheduled for 3 elections up to 2003 and was not re-conducted. The test was successful and gave no problems, despite this being the first election to use it. Optical reading of eVoting is VVAT and guarantees the possibility of a human recount. The extra control introduced is the creation of an expert committee to monitor the electronic election process. That committee discovered the high dependency of the ministry of interior toward the vendor of the eVoting system.
 * [|Electronic Voting in Belgium]** started in 1991 when two locations were chosen to experiment on different electronic voting systems. The law to permit this experiment was passed by an absolute majority with no opposition at all. One of the systems tested was based on a touch panel similar to those used in the Netherlands. The other system, still in use in 2004, is based on a magnetic card and a voting machine with a light pen.

In 2003 a new eVoting system was introduced in order to try and convince citizens that the system was safe. In the two locations that originally started eVoting, a "Ticketing" system was introduced. The principle of this is to add a printer next to the voting machine (magnetic card and light pen), and a paper copy of the vote is printed and approved by the voter. Once the elections are finished, all the paper votes (tickets) are counted and compared to the electronic result. In case of discrepancy, the paper version rules. The paper count and the electronic count matched nowhere, and it was decided (against the law) to favour the electronic result, which was considered more reliable. The law to organise this new test stated explicitly that this was for one election only. In 2004, for the European Elections, all the tests were ended and all 44% of the population already voting electronically did so with the magnetic card. Ticketing or Optical Reading were no longer used. Since 1999 no further locations migrated from paper to eVoting. The equipment acquired in 1994 was not supposed to be used in 2004; however, the government chose to use it for one more year.

In the elections on 18. May 2003 there was an electronic voting problem reported where one candidate got 4096 extra votes. The error was only detected because she had more preferential votes that her own list which is impossible in the voting system. The official explanation was The spontaneous creation of a bit at the position 13 in the memory of the computer. A sourecode analysis of the DigiVote system in 2004 found several obvious errors.

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In the above interview, we have interviewed four different people sharing there experiences on voting. However, two of these interviews were in Bangla. Below is a brief summary of the two interviews that were in Bangla.

1) ISD Chef - He discusses his experience on voting in 1987. He states that back in 1987, voting was quite a hassle. There used to be long queues in front of the voting centres and parties used to have their agents at each voting centre. Their were also times when one person would give his vote twice. There would also be fights between the public and the police. However, he is not aware of the system of voting that will happen in the upcoming elections.

2) ISD Photocopier, Mr. Manik - He has voted twice and has faced quite a bit of difficulties. At first he needed tohotm get his ticket and then he would need his serial number and then he would have to stand in line and wait for his turn to place his vote. Standing in line would mean standing there for 3-4 hours. He would prefer a system where one can vote through the internet. However, he would only like this system if voting can be carried out in a fair manner.


 * __ADVANTAGES AND DIS-ADVANTAGES OF E-VOTING__

ADVANTAGES ARE:** 1) Simple, intuitive interface. 2) Larger text for the visually disabled. 3) It will be a very easy process

1) Software bugs may corrupt voting results. 2) Lack of paper allows room for uncertainty concerning which candidate the computer has recorded. 3) Lack of paper makes recounts difficult, if necessary. 4) There have been complaints of conspiracy concerning the machine's creators, Diebold: > Computers may have been preprogrammed to add votes for selected party. > Computers may have been preprogrammed to subtract (or discount) votes for selected party. 5) Machines are susceptible to outside hacking, thus stacking potential is increased during the election.
 * DIS-ADVANTAGES ARE:**


 * ISSUES**

Lack of Paper Trail
Unlike most manual voting machines and methods, DRE Voting Machines do not leave any Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) after someone casts a ballot. This means that voters do not see a printed out verification that they selected their intended candidates, and that the machine accurately processed their vote. This obviously can create a certain amout of uneasiness on the part of individual voters, since they cannot confirm that their vote was cast at all, or even for their candidate. Another problem with the lack of any kind of VVPAT, is that it makes a recount (much like the one in Florida in 2000) nearly impossible, because due to software problems, there is no way to verify whether or not votes would be recounted accurately. Ohio plans to implement laws requiring the use of DRE's with VVPAT's by the 2006 mid-term elections, which would certainly settle some of the fears of the concerned citizens and voters.

Software Bugs
The same software that makes DRE machines incredibly user-friendly also makes them incredibly prone to software errors and bugs that can effect the elections in many ways. Bugs are existent in all software, and there is no way to possibly verify whether or not the software is bug-free before the voting process begins. Bugs oftentimes are not distributed equally throughout the entire election, meaning that if Candidate A suffers the loss of 20,000 votes from a software bug, chances are that Candidate B will not suffer the same loss, giving Candidate B a magical 20,000 vote advantage over his opponent. While errors of that magnitude would certainly be recognized by election officials, more subtle discrepancies might not show up, and these little discrepancies may be what matter most in the outcome of the election. Obviously in 2000, the errors that were present in Florida had major impacts on the turnout of the election. Here are some examples of software errors, from various sources that illustrate how these errors can go unnoticed.

1) [|http://people.virginia.edu/~sks5p/mdst110/lab3/electronic.html] - Electronic Voting v/s Other Forms of Voting 2) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting 3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_voting_machines - E-Voting in India 4) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Belgium - E-Voting in Belgium 5) [|http://people.virginia.edu/~jgm5f/mdst110/lab3/] - Issues Related to E-Voting
 * BIBLIOGRAPHY:**


 * This page has been maintained by Debanjan and Sunny**